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I. Plaintiff raises the issue of the application of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 5A(b\ 
asserting that the Court of Appeals applied Rule 54(b) in this matter. The Opinion 
of the Court of Appeals does not make any reference to Rule 54(b) and therefore 
to assert that this Court should examine the propriety of the Court of Appeals' 
decision regarding the Order to Show Cause in light of Rule 54(b) is incorrect. 
On page 14 of the Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Certiorari ("Plaintiffs Brief in 
Opposition"), Plaintiff asserts that the Court of Appeals has applied Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in reviewing the reconsideration by the trial court of the 
Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause after dismissal. As is evident from a careful 
reading of the Court of Appeals Opinion filed January 22, 1999 (the "Court of Appeals 
Opinion") the Court of Appeals did not base it's decision affirming the trial court's action 
on Rule 54(b). In fact, Rule 54(b) is not included in the Court of Appeals Opinion at 
any point. 
If this Court does determine that it is proper to consider the actions of the trial 
court in light of Rule 54(b), it is clear that such consideration would result in a decision 
that the trial court's reconsideration of the order to show cause was not appropriate. 
Rule 54(b) has two provisions which relate to orders and other forms of decision. 
First, Rule 54(b) allows for the certification of a trial court's determination as to one or 
more claims, as a final judgment, thus providing a basis for appeal of the determination. 
Second, Rule 54(b) provides that absent such a certification, 
"any order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights 
and liabilities of all the parties." 
In Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.. 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984), this Court described the 
three requirements for certification as a final judgment under Rule 54(b), that is: 
" First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the 
action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered on an 
order that would be appealable but for the fact that other claims or parties 
remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in its discretion, must make a 
determination that "there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal." 
L± at 767 (quoting 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civ. 2d §2656, at 47-48 (1983)). In further analysis of these requirements, the Court in 
Kennecott Corporation, et al. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 
1991), sought to clarify the second requirement as a judgment which ends the litigation 
on the merits of a separate claim. See, Kennecott. 814 P.2d at 1101-1106. 
The denial and dismissal of the Plaintiffs Motion for Order to Show Cause, is a 
determination which would have qualified for certification as a final judgment under 
Rule 54(b), however Plaintiff chose not to challenge the determination of the trial court 
and instead moved forward on a Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce. 
Simply because Plaintiff did not avail herself of the correct means by which to bring the 
Order to Show Cause back before the trial court, ie. through an appeal of the denial and 
dismissal and the resulting remand, does not mean that she should be rewarded by the 
trial court revisiting the matter on its own initiative. 
Secondly, it is clear from the decision of this Court in Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 
P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993), that a determination which has not been certified for appeal may 
be reconsidered by the rendering trial court upon the filing of a motion for 
reconsideration. No motion for reconsideration was filed in this matter, in fact, after the 
domestic relations commissioner ruled that this matter was more appropriately to be 
considered in the form of a petition for modification, the Plaintiff filed a petition for 
modification. 
Furthermore, the law of the case doctrine supports a determination that the trial 
court's sua sponte reconsideration of the order to show cause was inappropriate. As the 
Court of Appeals stated in Salt Lake City Corporation v. James Constructors. Inc.. 761 
P.2d 42, 44 (Utah App. 1988), n[t]he "law of the case" doctrine nonetheless promotes a 
measure of predictability in such cases by creating a kind of presumption that the court's 
prior rulings, even if not certified as final under Rule 54(b), were correct and should 
stand." The Court of Appeals further opined "[although a trial court is not inexorably 
bound by its own precedents, prior relevant rulings made in the same case are generally 
to be followed." Id, at 45, citing, People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court. 666 P.2d 
550, 554 (Colo. 1983). 
In the matter at hand, no action was taken by Plaintiff upon denial and dismissal 
of the Plaintiffs order to show cause. Plaintiff neither requested that the determination 
be certified as a final judgment, nor made a motion to the trial court for reconsideration 
of the issue. 
II. While merely rearguing her case as presented to the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff 
incorrectly asserts that new evidence has been introduced in Defendant's Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari. No new evidence has been introduced. Defendant's 
Petition contains explanations of the law appropriate to a determination of 
whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's 
application of terms in the Decree of Divorce. 
Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition does little more than reargue the position of 
Plaintiff asserted before the Court of Appeals, rather than addressing whether the issues 
asserted by Defendant are proper for review by this Court. 
Plaintiff asserts that the rule of Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991) was 
in fact satisfied by the Court of Appeals, by stating that it is evident that the Court of 
Appeals did examine the trial court's conclusions of law with respect to the meaning of 
bonus, and directing the attention of the Court to paragraph 21 of the Court of Appeals 
Opinion. See, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition at p. 9-10. Unfortunately, this does not 
support Plaintiffs assertion inasmuch as paragraph 21 of the Court of Appeals Opinion is 
merely a recitation of the findings entered by the trial court, not an indication of the 
Court Appeals' analysis or decision. At no point in the Court of Appeals Opinion is there 
an affirmation of the trial court's conclusions of law, in fact the Court of Appeals did not 
even reach this question due to a summary dismissal of Defendant's claims by way of 
finding that Defendant failed to marshal the evidence, and thereafter failing to finish the 
analysis required by Saunders and reviewing the conclusions of law. 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has "attempted to introduce new evidence 
(concerning the nature of K-l income) in the form of a chart in his Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari." Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition at p. 11. No new evidence was included in 
Defendant's Petition for a Writ, however Defendant did include a chart which 
summarizes relevant law for the use and information of the Court. In connection with 
this assertion Plaintiff also claims that the issue of K-l income is not relevant to the 
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the order to show cause. See, 
Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition at p. 11-13. Plaintiff again fails to understand that the 
proper treatment of amounts reported on a K-l to a shareholder, partner or member is 
relevant to any amount which may be required to be paid as alimony under a decree of 
divorce as originally written or as may be modified. Whether or not the tax designation 
of Defendant's employer, MST Trucking, Inc., changed before or after the Decree of 
Divorce was entered is not the fact which raises this issue, it is the mere fact that it must 
be determined what amounts should be considered as income of a payor spouse for 
purposes of calculating alimony. 
Plaintiff further implies that the question now before the Court has previously 
been decided by citation to two Court of Appeals cases, Morgan v. Morgan. 854 P.2d 
559 (Utah App. 1993) and Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992). Neither of 
these cases addressed the issue at hand. In Morgan, the Court of Appeals addressed the 
valuation of a closely held entity for purposes of determining a fair and equitable 
property distribution and affirmed the decision of the trial court in looking to the amount 
of the capital account shown on the schedule K-l for that purpose. Morgan. 854 P.2d at 
566. In Muir. the Court reviewed the determination of the trial court as to one spouse's 
income where the spouse was a 96.61% shareholder of a corporation. Muir. 841 P.2d at 
738-741. Although the question presented to the Court at this time is related to that 
presented in Muir. the facts at hand are quite different and more complex, ie. Defendant 
has not held more than a 24% interest in MST Trucking, Inc. and is not the only person 
voting on the proper operation of the entity. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and the arguments contained in the Defendant's Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari, Defendant respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari. 
Dated this 12* day of May, 1999, and respectfully submitted. 
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